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The evolving strategic competition in South Asiaposes an unprecedented challenge for U.S.policymakers who believe that “open-ended nuclear
weapon and missile programs in India and Pakistan
threaten regional and international security and increase the
risk of onward proliferation from the region.”2 Today India
and Pakistan are racing to modernize, expand, and
operationalize their nuclear deterrent capabilities. Several
decades of international nonproliferation measures helped
to delay, but not prevent, their testing and overt production
of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. In the past, the
United States learned how to deal with both allies (the
United Kingdom and France) and adversaries (the Soviet
Union and China) that went through a similar stage of
nuclear force modernization. But coping with the nuclear
maturation of nations with which Washington has neither a
formal alliance nor any real adversity is a novel undertaking
for which the U.S. government does not yet have a coher-
ent, long-term policy.3 Should the United States try to help,
hinder, or not involve itself with the modernization and
expansion of nuclear deterrent arsenals in South Asia? This
article examines the current policy challenges for the United
States in dealing with the India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry.
An effective policy response to the new strategic situa-
tion in South Asia must accomplish at least four objectives.
First, it must be based on a realistic assessment of the
ground realities in the region—not on wishful thinking that
the nuclear genie can be put back in the bottle. Like it or
not, India and Pakistan are racing to enhance the size,
sophistication, and operational readiness of their nuclear
strike arsenals. The nuclear problem in South Asia is
today qualitatively different than it was prior to the Indian
and Pakistani nuclear tests and declarations of May 1998.
Second, although Washington’s ability to influence
the strategic conduct of India and Pakistan is quite lim-
ited, even limited influence is possible only if U.S.
policymakers correctly understand the political and mili-
tary logic underpinning Indian and Pakistani force deci-
sions. Each side believes that, at a minimum, it needs a
secure, second-strike nuclear capability—a posture that
should be familiar to America because this same capabil-
ity has long been a requirement of U.S. nuclear policy.
Although in practice the United States and the Soviet
Union amassed nuclear arsenals far in excess of the types
and numbers of forces needed to achieve second-strike
stability, the strategic logic of deterrence is as applicable
Viewpoint
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now for Islamabad and New Delhi as it ever was for the
superpowers during the Cold War—and arguably much
more important because a nuclear arms race would be far
more risky and costly for India and Pakistan because of
their relatively fragile economies, political systems, and
nation-states.
Third, the primary regional goal of the United States
should be to reduce the risk of nuclear war in South Asia.
Washington has other important regional objectives—
such as combating terrorism, promoting democracy, and
creating economic growth. However, none of these can
be achieved if India and Pakistan conduct a nuclear war.
And the risk of their doing so is much higher than most
policymakers and analysts recognize.
Fourth, U.S. policymakers should try to ensure that
whatever they do to improve strategic stability in South
Asia does not increase the motivation or capability of
other countries to develop nuclear weapons. India and
Pakistan do not fit neatly into the nuclear nonprolifera-
tion regime. Even though neither of them signed the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT), that document—and thus the overall regime—
still recognize them as non-nuclear weapon states because
they did not manufacture and test nuclear explosive de-
vices prior to January 1967.4 Therefore, special efforts must
be made to bring India and Pakistan into the regime as
nuclear weapon states, even though they can never have
this status in terms of the NPT. (For that matter, Israel
also should be treated like India and Pakistan, because it
too never signed the treaty. Because Iran and North Ko-
rea did accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states,
however, they should be forced to honor their treaty com-
mitments—even though North Korea subsequently with-
drew from the NPT.) Should it prove impossible to reduce
the danger of an Indo-Pak nuclear war without causing
some damage to the regime, I suggest that averting an
India-Pakistan war should be a higher priority than avoid-
ing minor injury to the regime, in part because a nuclear
war would be far more harmful to the regime in the long
term.
THE DEMANDS OF DETERRENCE
Deterrence is a demanding strategy. One country deters
another by convincing it that the expected value of a cer-
tain action is outweighed by the expected punishment.
Deterrence can fail if the challenger doubts either the cost
of the punishment or the likelihood that it will be in-
flicted. When the concerned countries are both armed
with nuclear weapons, there generally is little doubt about
the cost of punishment: The destruction nuclear warfare
can cause is clear to all. However, for new nuclear-armed
states, such as India and Pakistan, one side might reason-
ably question whether the other has deployed enough
well-designed, well-built, and well-maintained nuclear
weapons to inflict sufficient punishment on the other side.
Or it might believe that its adversary’s nuclear arsenal is
vulnerable—because it is either very small or not well hid-
den or protected—and calculate that a preventive or pre-
emptive military strike could succeed. For India and Pakistan,
therefore, size does matter. The condition of mutually as-
sured destruction probably requires that each side be capable
of launching a devastating nuclear second strike, even if the
other side strikes first with nuclear weapons.
Were India and Pakistan able to deploy a sufficient
number of survivable nuclear weapon systems, and should
they convince each other of this situation, another chal-
lenge remains to be overcome to effect real deterrence.
When the threatened punishment can damage the defender
almost as much as the challenger, as is the case when each
possesses a sufficiently large arsenal of nuclear weapons,
the challenger has good reason to doubt the resolve of the
defender to carry out the threat: It could be suicidal.
Under these circumstances, a stalemate could be the most
likely outcome. In other words, mutual deterrence might
not be an automatic condition produced by each side’s
possession of usable and survivable nuclear weapons.
This is a contentious point. Because “a nation will be
deterred from attacking even if it believes that there is
only a possibility that the adversary will retaliate,” Ken-
neth Waltz argues that “the probability of major war among
states having nuclear weapons approaches zero.”5 Even
assuming that nuclear deterrence is nearly automatic, the
evidence shows that India and Pakistan, just like the
United States and the Soviet Union before them, have
acted as if deterrence is a very challenging outcome. Each
of these countries has labored over the other main require-
ment of deterrence policy, which lies in one side convinc-
ing the adversary that the threatened response is
credible—even if this leads to its own destruction. A coun-
try that is willing to maintain an assertive posture in the
face of the nuclear danger, thereby raising the risk of a
crisis spiraling out of control, is thus often rewarded. The
employment of what Thomas Schelling described as
“threats that leave something to chance” can enhance the
credibility of coercive or deterrent policies.6
However, this assertive approach to deterrence can
produce another kind of problem. It can increase tensions
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so much that war is made more likely. This is the concern
that preoccupied Bernard Brodie in 1959 and led him
to counsel:
Deterrence…depends on a subjective feeling which we
are trying to create in the opponent’s mind, a feeling
compounded of respect and fear, and we have to ask
ourselves whether it is not possible to overshoot the
mark. It is possible to make him fear us too much, espe-
cially if what we make him fear is our over-readiness to
react, whether or not he translates it into clear evi-
dence of our aggressive intent. The effective operation
of deterrence over the long term requires that the other
party be willing to live with our possession of the capa-
bility upon which it rests.7
In other words, fielding nuclear weapons and ballis-
tic missiles, and making bold deterrent threats ultimately
might be the easiest prerequisites for deterrence. Far more
challenging, but no less critical, are steps designed to make
each competitor feel confident that the other accepts its
right to exist. Otherwise, competitors could have a hard
time distinguishing assertive, defensive preparations for
retaliation from aggressive preparations for attack. Here,
arms control can help.8
 Although India and Pakistan have possessed nuclear
weapons capabilities for nearly two decades, they man-
aged to avoid dealing with the full implications of nuclear
deterrence—largely because of the intense nonprolifera-
tion pressures generated by the United States and other
concerned countries. Even after their May 1998 nuclear
explosive tests, Indian and Pakistan were slow to fashion
their newly validated nuclear weapon capabilities into
operational deterrence postures—again partly because of
international nonproliferation demands. However, two
post-1998 military conflicts forced the adversaries to
reassess their strategic force requirements.
The first conflict took place in the summer of 1999
when Indian and Pakistani troops clashed on the moun-
tain heights near the Indian village of Kargil. Even though
the fighting was confined to a relatively small section of
terrain in Indian-held Kashmir, each side was forced to
think through the implications of a larger war. Still more
serious was the military standoff of 2002. After terrorists
attacked the Indian parliament in December 2001, India
fully mobilized its armed forces for war. For nine months,
more than one million Indian and Pakistani soldiers girded
for battle along their 1,800-mile border. Foreign and
domestic pressures eventually induced India to withdraw
its forces, and the crisis subsided—but not before each
side undertook unprecedented preparations for the possi-
bility that a conventional war might escalate into a
nuclear exchange. Because the Kargil conflict of 1999 and
the composite crisis of 2001-2002 each risked escalation
to full-scale conventional war, and thus possibly to nuclear
war, New Delhi and Islamabad are now devoting consid-
erable attention to the long-neglected issues of strategic
force structure, targeting policy, positive and negative
command-and-control arrangements, declaratory nuclear
doctrine, and strategic signaling to communicate the cred-
ibility of deterrent threats during times of peace, crisis,
and possibly war.
Through the steps that India and Pakistan recently
have taken to expand their nuclear strike systems and to
signal the credibility of their deterrent threats, both coun-
tries are now behaving largely as strategic theory would
predict. But the United States and other world actors have
been slow to embrace this behavior because they believe
it carries a high risk of military escalation and exacerbates
the animosity and mistrust that have existed between
India and Pakistan for 55 years. U.S. officials thus face a
real conundrum. Should they base their policies toward
South Asia on the logic of nonproliferation or on the same
strategic logic that governed U.S. nuclear deterrence poli-
cies from 1945 to the present? Or should they try to blaze
some new “third way” on this issue? Should Washington
try to hinder the development of Indian and Pakistani
nuclear weapon and missile programs—as it does with Iran
and North Korea—or should it help these programs—as
it did with the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent,
France? In other words, should U.S. policymakers engage
Indian and Pakistani defense planners in serious dialogue
on strategic stability or leave them to their own devices?
SECURE NUCLEAR STRIKE ARSENALS
The maintenance of a secure second-strike nuclear arse-
nal is an unquestioned priority for the United States and
other first-generation nuclear powers; but curiously Wash-
ington does not condone this practice for India or Paki-
stan. Even after each of these countries conducted several
nuclear explosive tests and declared themselves nuclear
weapon states in May 1998, the United States still acted
largely according to the logic of nonproliferation and the
legal requirements of the NPT—even though neither
Islamabad nor New Delhi had acceded to this treaty. Presi-
dent William Clinton’s point person on South Asia after
the tests, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, affirmed
this in a November 1998 speech: “Unless and until they
disavow nuclear weapons and accept safeguards on all
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their nuclear activities they will continue to forfeit the
full recognition and benefits that accrue to members in
good standing of the NPT. This is a crucial and immu-
table guideline for our policy.”9 However, Talbott under-
stood that it would be a very long time, even under the
best of circumstances, before India and Pakistan would
accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. Thus
he pressed the nascent nuclear nations to move into rapid
compliance with five practical benchmarks: (1) ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), (2) halt all pro-
duction of fissile material, (3) limit the development and
deployment of missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft, (4)
tighten export controls on sensitive nuclear materials and
technologies, and (5) renew the bilateral dialogue aimed
at solving long-standing disputes.
At first, Indian and Pakistani leaders responded posi-
tively to U.S. diplomacy. They committed to strengthen-
ing their nuclear export controls, held a landmark bilateral
summit in Lahore, Pakistan, in February 1999, and came
close to signing the CTBT (with ratification left to the
future). In the end, however, the Lahore process broke
down when Indian and Pakistani forces clashed after the
latter secretly occupied several dozen mountain posts
inside Indian-controlled Kashmir near the town of Kargil.
The New Delhi and Islamabad governments refused to
sign the CTBT after the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the
treaty. And even Pakistan’s much-touted export control
reforms have come under fire over allegations that Paki-
stani scientists have helped North Korea and possibly even
Iran and other countries with centrifuge technology for
the production of bomb-grade uranium.10 As far as the
other two benchmarks are concerned, Indian and Paki-
stani defense planners never gave much thought to curb-
ing the production of fissile material or slowing the
development of diverse delivery systems.
India and Pakistan each possess stockpiles of nuclear
weapon components and could assemble and deploy a few
nuclear weapons within a few days to a week.11 Although
the New Delhi and Islamabad governments refuse to
reveal information about the size, composition, and opera-
tional status of their nuclear arsenals, a rough estimate
can be calculated from publicly available information.
Indian scientists probably are able to separate between
25 and 40 kilograms (kg) worth of bomb-grade plutonium
annually from the spent fuel produced at the Cirus and
Dhruva reactors, located at the Bhabha Atomic Research
Center (BARC) near Mumbai. Therefore, India could
accumulate a stockpile of between 300 kg and 640 kg of
bomb-grade plutonium by December 2003.12 India also
has a program to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU);
however, the small amount of material produced to date
probably has not gone into the nuclear weapons program
but is likely being stored to fuel the reactor India is devel-
oping for its planned nuclear submarine, the Advanced
Technology Vehicle.13 Assuming that Indian scientists
require 5 to 7 kg of plutonium to manufacture one war-
head,14 India probably can produce between 4 and 8
nuclear weapons each year, and thus could possess enough
fissile material for between 40 and 130 weapons, with 80
weapons as the median estimate.
Unlike India, which relies on plutonium for its weap-
ons, Pakistan’s nuclear program has been based on highly
enriched uranium. Assuming that Pakistan’s Kahuta enrich-
ment plant is able to produce between 80 kg and 140 kg
of weapons-grade uranium per year, Pakistan today could
have between 900 kg and 1,370 kg of HEU available for
weapons production. (The amount of HEU required for a
bomb is believed to range between 12 kg and 25 kg, de-
pending on the weapon design.) In addition, in 1998 Pa-
kistan commissioned an unsafeguarded heavy water
research reactor at Khushab, which is capable of yielding
enough plutonium to make a few nuclear weapons annu-
ally. Combining these possible plutonium and HEU in-
ventories, Pakistan could possess enough fissile material
to fabricate between 37 and 100 weapons, with 65 as the
median estimate.15 These estimates of possible Indian and
Pakistani fissile material stockpiles and nuclear weapon
capabilities are summarized in Table 1.
India and Pakistan each possess a wide variety of air-
craft and ballistic missiles that are, at least theoretically
capable of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets. In
2001, the U.S. Defense Department assessed that India
would most likely employ fighter-bomber aircraft to carry
nuclear weapons because its ballistic missiles probably
were not yet ready for this role.16 The Indian Air Force
operates several aircraft that could be employed for this
mission, but the best suited would be the Jaguar, Mirage-
2000, MiG-27, or Su-30 aircraft. India has deployed short-
range Prithvi 1 missiles that are capable of carrying a 1,000
kg warhead (the presumed maximum size of a nuclear de-
vice), but because of Prithvi’s restricted range, India most
likely will turn to its new solid-propellant Agni 1 missile,
which has a 700–900-kilometer (-km) range, or its 2,000–
3,000-km-range Agni 2 missile, as its preferred nuclear
platforms as soon as they become operational.
The Pakistan Air Force flies two kinds of aircraft
probably capable of nuclear weapons delivery: the U.S.-
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supplied F-16 and the French Mirage 5 jets. After the
United States suspended F-16 sales to Pakistan in 1990,
however, Islamabad placed a high priority on acquiring
ballistic missiles to offset India’s conventional military
advantages and to ensure reliable delivery of nuclear weap-
ons. Liquid-fuel Ghauri missiles, developed with North
Korean assistance, and solid-fuel Shaheen 1 & 2 missiles,
developed with Chinese assistance, probably would be
employed to deliver Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The
possible delivery systems in operation or under develop-
ment for India and Pakistan are described in Table 2.
Based on these force estimates, it would appear that
India and Pakistan each have secured an adequate stock-
pile of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to make the
other side abandon any notion of preventive or preemp-
tive attack. Nevertheless, Indian Finance Minister Jaswant
Singh proclaimed in September 2002 that every country
has the right to preemption and that “pre-emption or pre-
vention is inherent in deterrence.”17 Singh was trying to
warn Pakistan of the grave consequences it could face if
it did not cease its alleged support for the infiltration of
terrorists into Indian-held Kashmir and other parts of
Indian territory. He also was trying to send a signal to
Washington by justifying possible military action against
Pervez Musharraf’s Pakistan in the same terms that the
Bush administration used to justify its 2003 preventive
war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
Despite the tough talk, it is difficult to imagine that
Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee or any future
Indian leader would be bold or desperate enough to order
Indian armed forces to mount a major preventive war
against Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile. The numbers of
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and delivery platforms are not
large by the standards of first-generation nuclear powers
(even after their post-Cold War force cuts), but they
almost certainly are sufficiently numerous and difficult
to detect or destroy for Indian war planners to have any
confidence in a disarming first strike. Because of India’s
presumably larger weapons stockpile, more numerous de-
livery options, and greater geographical depth, the same
constraint definitely applies to Pakistan’s generals.
It should not be forgotten that the strategic competi-
tion between India and Pakistan is very dynamic. If
either India or Pakistan were able to make substantial
improvements in its intelligence, targeting, and precision-
strike mission areas—as well as in the realm of air and
missile defense—then its military planners might feel more
confident in their ability to launch a disarming first strike.
But these are big “ifs.” Domestic resource constraints and
some remaining international export restrictions make a
military-technological breakthrough unlikely in South
Asia at least for the next decade. Even if the wealthier
and more technologically advanced party, India, were to
able to make a giant leap forward in one or two of the
relevant military mission areas, remaining limitations in
the other areas probably would still require caution in stra-
tegic policymaking. When it comes to the delicate busi-
ness of launching preventive strikes against a fairly large,
well-concealed, and well-protected nuclear arsenal, per-
fection would seem to be a mandatory precondition for
action. Recall that President John F. Kennedy abandoned
the idea of launching military attacks against the Soviet
missile inventory in Cuba when his military advisor re-
ported that he could not guarantee 100 percent success.
Some modest number of survivable nuclear weapons
therefore would seem to be a prerequisite for strategic sta-
bility in modern-day South Asia, but specifying exactly
what this number is proves to be a very difficult task. As
in the case of the United States-Russia rivalry, where the
lowest nuclear stockpile needed for deterrence always has
been—and remains—a deeply controversial matter, In-
dia and Pakistan are hard pressed to quantify their own
minimum deterrence requirements. The problem is that
the size of the nuclear arsenal must be large enough not
only to deter the adversary, but also to make powerful
domestic constituencies confident in their own





 Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
India 300 430 640 Unknown Unknown Unknown 40 80 130 
Pakistan 10 25 60 900 1120 1370 37 65 100 
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Aircraft Range  
(hi-lo-hi) 
Source Status 
 Mirage-2000H 1,205 km France 2 squadrons, 35 planes in service 
 Su-30 MKI 3000 km Russia 50 planes purchased, 18 in service 
 Jaguar S(I) 850 km UK/France 4 squadrons, 88 planes in service 
 MiG-27 ML 500 km Russia 214 planes in service 
Missiles Range Source Status 
 Prithvi 1 (SS-150) 150 km Indigenous Army version, in service 
 Prithvi 2 (SS-250) 250 km Indigenous Air Force version, tested, in development 
 Prithvi 3 (Danush) 350 km Indigenous Navy version, failed test in 2000, in 
development 
 Agni 1 700 - 900 
km 
Indigenous Tested on 25 January 2002, in 
production 
 Agni 2 2,000-
3,000 km 
Indigenous Tested in 1999 and 2001, in 
development 
India 
 Agni 3 3,500-
4,000 km 
Indigenous In development 
Aircraft Range  
(hi-lo-hi) 
Source Status 
 F-16 A/B 925 km United States 32 planes in service 
 Mirage 5 PA 1,300 km France 50 planes in service 
Missiles Range Source Status 
 Hatf 1 80 km Indigenous In service since mid-1990s 
 Hatf 2 (Abdali) 180 km Indigenous/China Tested May 2002, in production 
 Hatf 3 (Ghaznavi) 290 km Indigenous/China Based on M-11, tested October 2003, 
in service 
 Hatf 4  
(Shaheen 1) 
600 km Indigenous/China Based on M-9, tested October 2003, in 
service 
 Hatf 5 (Ghauri) 1,500 km Indigenous/DPRK Based on No Dong, tested in May 2002, 
in service 
Pakistan 
 Hatf 6 (Shaheen 2)  2,000-
2,500 km 




POTENTIAL INDIAN AND PAKISTANI NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS
Source: Jane’s Sentient Security Assessment–South Asia; Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, and various media reports.
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country’s security (and their own organization’s rightful
share of national security resources). Arguably, this inter-
nal factor was one of the main causes of the superpower
arms race. Unless this issue can be addressed head-on, do-
mestic politics and organizational rivalries also will pro-
pel India and Pakistan to build many more weapons (and
deploy them in more threatening configurations) than
minimum deterrence would seem to demand.
Engaging India and Pakistan in frank discussions about
the specific force requirements for minimum deterrence
would seem to be a prudent course of action for the U.S.
government. But curiously George W. Bush, just like his
predecessor, William Clinton, has refused to embrace this
as a policy objective. Rather, Washington still discourages
India and Pakistan from developing reliable second-strike
capabilities. John S. Wolf, Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation in the Bush administration, explained
the persistence of nonproliferation logic for South Asia
in an April 2002 speech: “We hope that confidence-build-
ing measures like keeping weapons and delivery systems
separated, halting fissile material production, and restrain-
ing nuclear and missile programs can be implemented.”18
It is possible that the Bush administration wishes to freeze
Indian and Pakistani strategic programs where they pres-
ently are, not because of concerns about strategic stabil-
ity, but to reduce the number of fissile materials, warheads,
and missiles that could fall into the wrong hands. In this
respect, Wolf indicated: “Tightened export controls are
also vital to ensure that India and Pakistan do not be-
come a source for sensitive materials and technology.”19
If India and Pakistan enlarge their nuclear arsenals in
the name of deterrence, the question might arise as to
which is a bigger risk to international security: a nuclear
war in South Asia or the loss of control over a larger and
more sophisticated nuclear arsenal? Fortunately, herein
lies one of the few bits of good news. A bigger and better
nuclear arsenal does not necessarily translate into a harder
arsenal to control. Enhanced deterrence can go hand in
hand with tighter control and the reduced risk of theft.
However, if one side believed that the risk of an attack on
its vulnerable arsenal were high, it would feel compelled
to redeploy its forces to new defensive positions; and
whenever nuclear weapons are deployed out of their safe
garrisons, the risk of loss of control increases.
Ensuring tight, centralized control of Indian and Paki-
stani nuclear weapons is an important U.S. policy con-
cern, especially in an era when terrorists seeking weapons
of mass destruction have been known to operate in and
around South Asia. Not only is this objective compatible
with strategic stability, it provides an even more urgent
reason for Washington to engage in serious strategic dia-
logues with Islamabad and New Delhi: to reduce the like-
lihood that one side or the other would be driven to
reckless force deployments, which would significantly raise
the risk of nuclear theft or loss of control.
THE CREDIBILITY PROBLEM
When it comes to deterring direct nuclear attack against
the core territory of either India or Pakistan, there is little
problem of credibility. Neither side is foolish enough to
doubt that such an attack would be met with a swift and
devastating nuclear counterattack. The real credibility
problem arises with respect to deterring limited military
challenges, whether in the form of frequent, small-scale
military intrusions across the Kashmir Line of Control
(LOC; as occurred in Siachen in 1984 and Kargil in
199920), Pakistan’s support for the insurgency in Kashmir,
or India’s pursuit of limited military options to curtail this
support. As Indian defense analyst Raja Menon put it, the
Kargil conflict in particular, “demonstrated that the Sub-
continental nuclear threshold probably lies territorially
in the heartland of both countries, and not on the Kash-
mir cease-fire line.”21 This is why India immediately mo-
bilized for war after terrorists attacked the parliament
building in New Delhi in 2001, but were relatively re-
strained when Pakistani forces infiltrated into the Kargil
heights in Indian-held Kashmir in 1999. How then do
India and Pakistan credibly signal their preparedness to
respond to limited military challenges at the conventional
or subconventional (guerilla) levels with punishing force?
In the past few years, Indian and Pakistani officials
have resorted to various kinds of signals to communicate
their resolve to respond to limited military challenges.
These signals also have been designed to convey their
interest in keeping conflict limited, and sometimes to
communicate their interest in resolving the crisis. In some
cases, Indian or Pakistani leaders intend to convey only
one message to one audience, usually to the other side’s
leadership. In other cases, signals are intended to reach
multiple audiences, such as the domestic population, the
U.S. government, and other third parties. In other circum-
stances, multiple messages are intended, sometimes to
multiple audiences. These signaling efforts can be di-
vided into two categories: direct communication and
tacit communication.
Direct communication has included: (1) private state-
ments made either through formal government channels,
such as embassies, or through back-channel communica-
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tions among government-appointed representatives; (2)
private statements made to third parties, such as the U.S.
government; and (3) public statements made by civilian
and military officials. For various reasons, direct commu-
nication is often incomplete, sometimes extremely diffi-
cult, and at other times not desirable. Under any of these
circumstances, the Indian and Pakistani governments
have resorted to tacit bargaining (or tacit communica-
tion). The three most prominent types have included
force deployments, missile tests, and military firing across
the Kashmir LOC. At times of crisis, tacit bargaining might
be even more reliable than direct communication because
the signals would be taken much more seriously.
Tacit communication through risky military conduct
has become commonplace in South Asia. While some-
times disturbing to the populations of India and Pakistan
and usually always distressing to the international com-
munity, this behavior is a logical response to the strategic
predicament in which India and Pakistan now find them-
selves. The presence of nuclear weapons has not altered
the desire of India and Pakistan to “win” crises, but it has
strengthened their interest in avoiding war. This condition
creates a paradox. India and Pakistan would appear to have
every incentive to exhibit prudence during a crisis and
avoid potentially catastrophic escalation, but at the same
time, to reinforce their reputations for resolve, they have
powerful new incentives to run risks and to stand firm in
the face of the other side’s risky behavior. Faced with simi-
lar circumstances during the Cold War, the United States
and the Soviet Union raised their “provocation thresh-
old” (that is, the level at which provocative political or
military moves might provoke a military response) and
devised creative, new options to exercise coercion short
of war. The same pattern is now apparent in South Asia,
with border shelling, cross-border intrusions, and costly
force deployments now almost everyday occurrences.
U.S. government officials believe that these costly,
reputation-enhancing signals are reckless. Indeed they
probably are. But they also are driven by the logic of the
strategic situation. American policymakers who cannot
understand why Indian and Pakistani leaders run such
dangerous risks suffer from selective memory loss, for
the United States and the Soviet Union turned similar risk-
taking into a well-rehearsed form of art early in the Cold
War. Whereas Washington and Moscow learned to tem-
per their strategic competition after the Cuban missile cri-
sis, New Delhi and Islamabad do not appear to have
undergone a parallel nuclear learning process—even
though the 2001-2002 composite military crisis might
have been regarded as their “Cuban crisis.” As a result,
American exhortations to “reduce nuclear risks” are likely
to ring hollow to the Indians and Pakistanis who recall
U.S. and Soviet strategic conduct during the Cold War.22
Moreover, in many respects both Indian and Pakistani
policymakers believe that their strategies of brinks-
manship worked well during the 1999 Kargil conflict and
the 2001-2002 composite military crisis. Indians believe
that the application of intense force against the intruders
in the Kargil heights, coupled with credible threats to
widen the conflict if necessary, compelled Pakistan to with-
draw its remaining forces. Many Pakistanis feel that while
they agreed under heavy U.S. pressure to vacate their well-
defended mountain positions, they deterred India from
expanding the conflict by signaling their willingness to
respond to Indian escalation with conventional, and pos-
sibly nuclear, counterattacks.
As noted above, after terrorists attacked India’s par-
liament building in December 2001, Indian Prime Minis-
ter Atal Bihari Vajpayee ordered the full mobilization of
Indian armed forces and told them to prepare for a major
attack against Pakistan, which Indian intelligence services
assessed was behind this and other terrorist attacks on
Indian soil. The Pakistanis claimed that they again “de-
terred” Indian plans to attack in the early winter and sum-
mer of 2002.23 This interpretation gained even more
credibility in light of President Musharraf’s statement on
December 30, 2002, that war with India was averted be-
cause of his repeated warnings that should Indian forces
cross the border, Pakistan’s response would not be con-
fined to conventional warfare. Although President
Musharraf did not specifically mention the threat of
nuclear weapons in his speech to an army corps reunion
in Karachi, he did state that he was prepared to take se-
vere military measures at the height of the 2002 crisis:
“In my meetings with various world leaders, I conveyed
my personal message to Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee
that the moment Indian forces cross the Line of Control
and the international border, then they should not ex-
pect a conventional war from Pakistan.” Musharraf added,
“I believe my message was effectively conveyed to Mr.
Vajpayee.”24 Despite the fact that war was only narrowly
averted in 2002, Pakistani military planners now appear to
have even more confidence in their ability to manage the
risks of conventional-nuclear deterrence. Similarly, Indian
officials believe that their major military mobilization co-
erced Musharraf into at least temporarily abandoning his
support of “cross-border terrorism” and made the United
States more sensitive to the issue of terrorism in Kashmir
and elsewhere on Indian territory.
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Because major war was avoided in South Asia’s re-
cent crises, and because officials in New Delhi as well as
in Islamabad “learned” that their strategy of brinkmanship
paid off, it is likely that during the next crisis each side
will resort to new forms of risky military behavior to sig-
nal their reputations for resolve, to score limited gains,
and, hopefully, to avert a nuclear war. Although the In-
dian and Pakistani governments will go to great lengths
to keep the United States at arm’s length from their stra-
tegic planning processes, lest Washington try to apply un-
wanted pressure,25 U.S. officials can and should try to play
a constructive role in Indian and Pakistani efforts to bring
their political and military conduct in line with the im-
peratives of nuclear ownership. We are all fortunate that
a major war did not break out in 1999 or 2002, but U.S.
policymakers would be prudent to help India and Paki-
stan head off the next serious military crisis lest it trigger
the war that nobody wants.
AN UNUSUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR U.S. POLICY
The United States has an unusual opportunity to influ-
ence strategic events in the region. Washington has long
tried to maintain good relations with India and Pakistan,
but because of the intense competition between these two
rivals, which began with their independence from British
dominion in August 1947, the United States has never
been able to maintain close relations with both countries
simultaneously. When U.S. security relations were good
with Pakistan, relations with India were bad. This was true
for much of the Cold War when India pursued a policy of
nonalignment and leaned toward the Soviet Union, while
Pakistan could be counted on as a staunch ally in the
struggle against communism. When the United States
moved closer to India after the Sino-Indian war of 1962
and again in the 1990s after the breakup of the Soviet
Union, U.S. security ties with Pakistan suffered. What is
unique about the current period is that the United States
has exceptionally good bilateral relations with both In-
dia and Pakistan.26 For the first time in history, Washing-
ton conducts regular bilateral “strategic dialogues” with
both India and Pakistan. The challenge, therefore, is for
Washington to translate the increased leverage it enjoys
with the governments in New Delhi and Islamabad into
tangible progress in stabilizing and restraining their stra-
tegic competition.
The logic of nonproliferation no longer applies to the
India-Pakistan rivalry. The international community still
can play a very important role in helping India and Paki-
stan make steady improvement in their nuclear and missile
export control policies and procedures, but constructive
measures intended to help New Delhi and Islamabad lower
the risk of war, especially a nuclear war, require a different
logic—actually the familiar strategic logic that has gov-
erned U.S. nuclear policy from 1945 to the present.27 Such
an approach would mark a major departure in thinking
about new nuclear states. It would require more than psy-
chological change. The U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy,
which tends to devise technical solutions to technical
problems, now must develop a strategic solution to a new
strategic predicament in South Asia. Toward this end, U.S.
policymakers might wish to consider the following courses
of action for reducing the nuclear danger in South Asia:
• Continue the bilateral strategic dialogues that began
with Strobe Talbott’s discussions after the May 1998
nuclear tests and were resumed by the Bush adminis-
tration. However, such dialogues should not simply
be seen as a forum for U.S. officials to preach nuclear
and missile nonproliferation. Rather, the goal should
be to gain a greater mutual understanding of the per-
ceived requirements of deterrence stability and stra-
tegic restraint, and to help India and Pakistan build
greater stability and restraint into their strategic com-
petition.
• Accept Indian and Pakistani compulsions for the
development of a relatively small number of surviv-
able, second-strike nuclear forces—at least in private,
if not in formal policy pronouncements. There are
two critical challenges here.  First, for reasons out-
lined above, India and Pakistan might not be con-
tent with minimum deterrent capabilities. Many of
the same forces that drove the United States and the
Soviet Union to stockpile numbers and kinds of
nuclear weapons well in excess of any plausible stra-
tegic need probably also will operate in South Asia.
Second, India faces a strategic competition with
China as well as Pakistan; thus New Delhi might feel
compelled to build an arsenal to match that country
even though it could far exceed the requirements for
deterring Pakistan. The point is that if the United
States does not immediately engage India and Paki-
stan in serious deliberations about the requirements
of minimum deterrence, the opportunity could soon
be lost.
• Encourage India and Pakistan to see arms control as a
vital element of national security, much as the United
States and the Soviet Union did after the 1962 Cu-
ban missile crisis. Previous nonproliferation measures
disguised as arms control—such as the CTBT and the
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)—might be
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useful starting points, but meaningful arms control in
South Asia probably has to be initiated from inside
the region, not imposed from the outside.  This is why
it makes sense for the United States to discuss the
process of arms control and the linkage between arms
control and national security, rather than proposing
specific arms control initiatives for India and Pakistan.
• Examine options for bringing India and Pakistan into
the nuclear nonproliferation regime as nuclear
weapon states.28 Because the NPT does not permit
the recognition of additional nuclear weapon states
beyond the first five (the United States, Russia, Brit-
ain, France, and China), this will not be an easy pro-
cess, but the costs to the regime of continuing to ig-
nore the reality of a nuclear South Asia are likely to
climb in the future.
• Continue to emphasize the importance of stringent
nuclear and missile export controls and continue to
apply tough sanctions for noncompliance with inter-
national export standards. Critics contend that the
Bush administration is not doing enough to crack
down on Pakistan over recent allegations that it pro-
vided nuclear assistance to North Korea, Iran, and
possibly other countries. Because no reliable evidence
has been provided to prove these allegations, how-
ever, one should take the U.S. government at its word
that it is closely monitoring the situation and will act
swiftly and decisively if reliable evidence of reckless
nuclear exports does surface.
• Share information on “best practices” for ensuring the
safety and security of nuclear weapons—especially,
but not only, during storage, transportation, and pos-
sibly deployment to operational positions. However,
such information sharing should not take place by it-
self. It should be tied to meaningful bilateral (and
possibly multilateral) dialogues about the require-
ments of effective nuclear deterrence, for best prac-
tices are only “best” if they satisfy military as well as
political needs.
• Prepare the ground in peacetime for active crisis man-
agement diplomacy the next time India and Pakistan
prepare for war. The United States played a crucial
role in helping India and Pakistan to manage the mili-
tary crises of 1999 and 2001-2002. U.S. policymakers
should anticipate the more demanding requirements
of doing this the next time. In addition, Washington
should begin planning now for assertive diplomatic
actions to discourage nuclear escalation should India
and Pakistan find themselves at war for the fourth time
in their history.
• Discuss with Indian and Pakistani government offi-
cials concrete steps that could be taken to work out
solutions to their bilateral disputes, especially regard-
ing the political status of Kashmir. Arguably, this is
the most important task; but it also is the hardest.
The point is that, while a meaningful peace process is
long overdue, measures to improve strategic stability
should not be held hostage to what would surely be a
long and painful process.
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